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Criminal investigations are guided by repetitive and time-consuming information retrieval tasks, often with 
high risk and high consequence. If Artificial intelligence (AI) systems can automate lines of inquiry, it 
could reduce the burden on analysts and allow them to focus their efforts on analysis. However, there is a 
critical need for algorithmic transparency to address ethical concerns. In this paper, we use data gathered 
from Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA) interviews of criminal intelligence analysts and perform a novel 
analysis method to elicit question networks. We show how these networks form an event tree, where events 
are consolidated by capturing analyst intentions. The event tree is simplified with a Dynamic Chain Event 








Criminal investigations involve high risk and high 
consequence situations in which it is vital that accurate and 
timely information is available to decision makers. Criminal 
intelligence analysts use this information for reasoning so that 
they, and their superiors, can make well informed decisions on 
important questions such as where to allocate resources, who 
to consider as potential suspects, or what risks a victim faces. 
Past research has considered the processes applied in criminal 
intelligence analysis, finding that they involve an “iterative 
combination of abductive, inductive and deductive inferences, 
information searching, associations, and further sense-
making” (Wong and Kodagoda, 2016). Manual information 
searching comprises a significant proportion of this, where 
“each piece of insight leads to intense periods of manual 
information gathering” (Hepenstal et. al. 2019b) and the initial 
investigation scope frames subsequent lines of inquiry. The 
potential benefits of speeding up this process are significant, 
where, if in a threat to life situation, reducing the time to find 
crucial information “could save someone’s life” (Hepenstal et. 
al. 2019b). Artificial intelligence (AI) systems that can 
automate questioning to explore various investigation paths, 
therefore, present a significant opportunity for investigators to 
both speed up investigations and to challenge their initial 
scope. However, in such a high risk and high consequence 
domain there are important ethical concerns around bias and 
algorithmic opacity (Duquenoy, 2018) and these are potential 
barriers to the adoption of complex systems. A lack of 
understanding and oversight of algorithmic processes is 
identified as a serious issue by both system users, for example 
police officers (Babuta, 2019), and by human rights 
campaigners (Couchman, 2019). There are, therefore, critical 
design requirements for autonomous systems to be used in the 
context of criminal investigations, and a notable issue is the 
need for algorithmic transparency (Hepenstal et. al. 2019a). 
In this paper, we show the potential to model an event 
tree and a Dynamic Chain Event Graph (DCEG) (Barclay et. 
al. 2013) that represents the lines of inquiry in an 
investigation. A DCEG is a discrete graphical model 
constructed from infinite event trees. We analyse data from 
Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA) (Klein et. al. 1993) interviews 
with expert analysts, each interview covering a specific 
investigation scenario, to identify question networks and 
underlying intentions. We use these networks to form event 
trees that define a DCEG. We provide an example case to 
demonstrate how the DCEG identifies helpful investigation 
paths in a new investigation scenario. A DCEG simplifies 
infinite and complex option stages in an event tree, to form an 
accessible visual representation of the statistical model. A 
DCEG therefore provides a foundation to explore 
investigation paths, whilst clearly articulating them to 
analysts. In previous work, we have developed a 
conversational agent (CA) for information retrieval that 
provides algorithmic transparency of its reasoning (Hepenstal 
et. al. 2020a). We used the Recognition-Primed Decision 
(RPD) model to deliver an explanation structure for intention 
concepts, in order to enhance user recognition and 
understanding of system behaviours. We propose to build 
upon this research to represent investigation pathways within a 
DCEG, where intention concepts inform the relationships 
between stages. We believe that this approach provides a 
platform for autonomous multi-stage reasoning, which tackles 
critical transparency issues for using AI systems in the field of 
criminal intelligence analysis.  
 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS ARE HAMPERED BY 
INFORMATION OVERLOAD 
 
In criminal investigations it is typical that analysts make 
repeated requests for information (Kodagoda and Wong 
2016), with each new piece of insight requiring validation and 
triggering additional lines of inquiry. Much of this data 
processing is manual and time consuming, suffering from 
strict resource constraints. As explained by Mark Stokes, Head 
of Digital, Cyber and Communications Forensics Unit for the 
Metropolitan Police, “in digital forensics within England and 
Wales, the capacity to undertake what is required on criminal 
investigations is not there. We currently have a seven-month 
backlog.” (Stokes, 2018) Cressida Dick, Commissioner of the 
Metropolitan Police, reiterates the scale of information where 
she states, “there is so much data that has to be looked at…” 
  
and “if police were able to harness data more effectively, a 
‘very, very large proportion’ of crimes could be solved.” 
(Shaw, 2019) Criminal investigations involve high risk and 
high consequence scenarios and therefore the impacts of time 
saving can be significant. Additionally, past research has 
found that the scope of an investigation, while important to 
help direct inquiries when resources are stretched, can also be 
restrictive and introduce bias (Hepenstal et. al. 2019b). 
Traditional analysis methods used to broaden analyst thinking 
and address bias in investigations, such as analysis of 
competing hypotheses (ACH) are also flawed (Dhami et. al. 
2019). AI systems that can perform their own investigations 
autonomously, whilst recommending information that may be 
of interest to an analyst, have the potential to speed analysis 
and challenge investigation scope without further burdening 
analysts. This could include the identification of known and 
unknown ‘unknowns’ (Logan, 2019). Even if a system can 
explore only simple paths and make recommendations, 
triggered by an initial question from an analyst, it could 
provide helpful assistance. 
 
SYSTEMS MUST EXPLAIN THEIR INFLUENCE 
 
Systems are used across a wide range of domains to 
make recommendations, for example to suggest items to buy 
following an initial purchase or additional films to watch. 
However, there are serious ethical considerations when it 
comes to criminal intelligence analysis, where algorithmic 
bias can have severe consequences. For example, if a system 
directs investigation resources towards an innocent person, 
through discriminatory processes.  
Algorithmic bias can occur in various ways. “Human 
error, prejudice, and misjudgement can enter into the 
innovation lifecycle and create biases at any point in the 
project delivery process from the preliminary stages of data 
extraction, collection, and pre-processing to the critical phases 
of problem formulation, model building, and implementation.” 
(Leslie, 2019) Human rights campaigners have raised 
concerns over the use of AI systems in the criminal justice 
system, where “the nature of decision making by machines 
means there is no option to challenge the process, or hold the 
system to account.” (Couchman, 2019) Police analysts have 
also raised concerns that an inability to understand and 
challenge machine reasoning, and any bias that may have been 
introduced, is a critical barrier to the use of complex systems 
(Hepenstal et. al., 2019b). Central to the ability to challenge 
and critique machine reasoning is the provision of algorithmic 
transparency. In past work, we developed an algorithmic 
transparency framework that identifies the need, in high risk 
and high consequence domains, to provide both an explanation 
of a system response together with the ability to inspect and 
verify the goals and constraints of the system behaviour 
(Hepenstal et. al., 2019a). Hoffman et. al. (2018) identify 
some key concepts in literature on explaining systems, for 
example, that explanation is a continuous process, 
collaborative, triggered in specific situations, improves 
learning and understanding, should clearly articulate caveats 
and limitations, and should ensure the user understands what 
is not being done as much as what is being done. Previously, 
we have developed a transparent approach to interpret user 
intentions when interacting with a conversational agent (CA) 
(Hepenstal et. al., 2020). This approach can deliver 
explanations that meet the key concepts. Crucially, we provide 
an intention architecture that uses the way in which humans 
recognise situations, the Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) 
model (Klein 1993, Hepenstal et. al. 2019b), to structure 
explanations of the functional modules triggered by the 
intention. This architecture allows a user to pick apart system 
behaviours, in terms of the intention triggered by their input, 
to clearly articulate caveats and limitations and to identify 
contrasting intentions. The explanation structure has been 
designed for a single stage interaction. The analyst asks a 
question and triggers the CA to do some processing based 
upon the matched intention. The analyst can step into the 
answer, to see explanations of the various functional 
processes, where intention attributes mirror the explanation 
structure of the RPD model. For an AI system to be able to 
conduct autonomous investigations it requires multiple stages 
of processing. We propose that our intention architecture and 
explanation structure aids us in providing transparency for 
multi-stage processes, by combining multiple intentions in a 
series.   
       
ACCESSIBLE MODELLING OF EVENT SEQUENCES 
 
Past approaches have looked to provide explainable 
recommendations for event sequences. EventAction (Du et. al 
2019), for example, can be used to recommend an action plan 
to a student based upon their similarity to past students and 
their desired outcome, such as to become a Professor. 
EventAction models sequences of events as a probabilistic 
suffix tree, based upon historic events, and applies a Markov 
Decision Process (MDP) and Thompson Sampling to compute 
and select a recommended action plan. A probabilistic event 
tree could be a helpful way to explain possible inquiries at 
each stage of an investigation, where with each response to a 
question the analyst will have a set of options for how to 
proceed. “Shafer demonstrated that an elicited tree was often a 
much more powerful expression of an observer’s beliefs about 
a process”, compared to other approaches to elicit a model 
such as a Bayesian network (BN) (Shafer 1996, Smith and 
Anderson 2008). Additionally, for capturing decision events in 
an investigation, an event tree “provides a natural framework 
through which time sequences can be incorporated” (Barclay 
et. al., 2013). An event tree, however, can become complex to 
represent visually as it grows. A Chain Event Graph (CEG) 
can rectify this. “The CEG is derived from a probability tree 
which is simplified into a CEG by introducing the concepts of 
‘stages’ and ‘positions’. These group the vertices in the tree 
together according to the associated conditional probabilities 
on their edges.” (Barclay et. al., 2013) The graphical nature of 
a CEG presents a useful opportunity for interpretability where 
a user can see what variables have influence over others, and 
can validate whether this is acceptable. Thwaites et. al. (2010) 
find that, “as with Causal BNs, the identifiability of the effects 
of causal manipulations when observations of the system are 
incomplete can be verified simply by reference to the topology 
of the CEG.” Chiappa and Isaac (2019), have demonstrated 
  
that BNs are a “simple and intuitive visual tool for describing 
different possible unfairness scenarios underlying a dataset”, 
and this also applies to the CEG. CEGs therefore have useful 
qualities for providing transparency in criminal investigations, 
where it is important to trace back through reasoning steps and 
to understand what and how states, or questions, have 
influenced each subsequent piece of information gathered. The 
decisions made at each step seek to achieve some goal and 
communication of these and the underlying reasoning is 
crucial when developing observable autonomous systems. 
McDermott et. al. suggest that a system should understand the 
goals of the human users and communicate their intent in 
terms of what goals it is trying to accomplish for a task 
(McDermott et. al. 2018). A CEG that chains together cues, 
methods and goals for questions, is an effective foundation for 
observable autonomous reasoning.       
Investigations involve repetitive questioning strategies. 
If, for example, a vehicle is presented in an output, an analyst 
may look for the owner and for any events in the database 
which have involved the vehicle. They may wish to do this 
every time a vehicle is found throughout their investigations. 
In these cases, the options available are repeated at different 
stages in the investigation and the event tree is infinite. We 
capture the topology of an infinite staged tree in a similar way 
to the CEG by using a Dynamic CEG (DCEG), as described 
by Barclay et. al. (2013). A DCEG provides a succinct 
explanation of the stages available and their influences on one 
another, which could help to achieve algorithmic transparency. 
In our system event selections trigger complex processes that 
themselves require explaining, and we utilise our intention 
architecture (Hepenstal et. al., 2019b, Hepenstal et. al., 
2020a), underpinned with an explanation structure reflecting 
the RPD model. In this paper, we model an event tree to form 
a DCEG (Barclay et. al., 2013). The DCEG is a useful aid to 
explore possible investigation paths, where each state reflects 
the explanation structure of the relevant intention.  
 
Table 1: Question Elicitation Example 
Statement [CTA; Analyst 4; 
2.00 -> 10.00]  (Input=Suspect 
Phone Number) 
Specific Need Specific Question 
"3 things you do instantly with 
the number. Stick it through 
your (databases), see if any 
other existing links. ... Check 
with all call data we have 
collected from operation... run 
subscriber checks on numbers 
he has called to get info on 
contract subscriber...We then 
go and find other phone calls 
(involving suspect phone 
number)... Can get call data 
for others in the network… 
also check all numbers 
additional people have phoned 
against all other numbers (in 
databases)." [A4; 2.00 -> 
10.00]  
See if any other 
existing links for 
phone number 
Is the phone number 
connected to known 
events? 
Check with all call 
data and subscriber 
checks 
What people are 
associated to phone 
number? 
Find other phone calls 
What calls involved 
this phone number? 
Get call data for 
others in network 
What numbers are 
being called? 
What calls involved 
these numbers 
Check all numbers 
additional people have 
phoned against all 
other numbers 
What people are 
linked to these 
numbers 
What known events 




We conducted Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA) 
interviews, applying the Critical Decision Method (CDM), 
with four criminal intelligence analysts. In each interview we 
delved into a particularly memorable investigation that they 
were involved in from start to end. For this study, we were 
most interested in how analysts questioned data as they sought 
to retrieve information to advance their investigations, in 
particular how questions led to insights that triggered 
subsequent inquiries. Each analyst had more than 3 years’ 
experience. We have previously analysed the interview data to 
identify distinct questions and to structure them against the 
Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model (Hepenstal et. al., 
2019b, IUI ExSS 2020). In this study we revisit these 
questions and identify links between them, where a link can be 
drawn if the result of one question is subsequently used to 
form cues in another. The questions could be asked of a 
conversational agent (CA) to retrieve the information required 
and we propose that question networks can be captured 
dynamically in the future through such interactions. 
 
Figure 1: Question Network for Firearm Scenario 
 
 
ANALYSIS: ELICITING QUESTION NETWORKS 
FROM INTERVIEW DATA 
 
Drawing upon timeline analysis of the investigations 
(Hepenstal et. al., 2019b), we extracted questions asked by 
analysts in the order in which they were considered. Analyst 
questions were related to specific input cues, for example an 
entity found in the results of a previous inquiry. Interview 
statements tend to describe general processes performed in the 
investigation; Table 1 presents some examples to demonstrate 
how questions were elicited. We have attempted to capture the 
underlying information needs from each statement, and have 
extracted from this specific questions that could address 
requirements. Analyst questions are not asked in isolation, 
where there are directed relationships if the outputs of one 
feed another. The relationships between questions can be more 
clearly presented as a network and we applied a novel analysis 
technique to form networks from the interview data. Figure 1 




Figure 2: Resulting event tree from the starting point ‘Suspects telephone number’.     
 
Each node in the network represents a question event, 
where an analyst passes some cues in their question and 
performs some tasks according to their intention. In each event 
an analyst has options on how to process the results, 
represented by edges.  
 
FORMING AN EVENT TREE FOR QUESTIONNING: 
EXAMPLE CASE RESULTS 
 
We have used our previous work on developing intention 
concepts (Hepenstal et. al., 2019b, Hepenstal et. al., 2020) to 
consolidate question events for two interview scenarios, a 
kidnapping and a firearm dealing, allowing us to build an 
abstract question network. In our abstract network a node 
(question event) requires three components: an input i.e. the 
question subject (e.g. a phone number), a query class (e.g. 
people), and an intention. The intention defines the way in 
which the question will be processed. We can make our event 
stages more or less domain specific by manipulating class 
granularity.  
A third interview scenario involved an attempted murder, 
where the female victim was found alone in her house and the 
incident was reported by her husband, who claimed to be on 
the phone with her at the time of the assault. The analyst 
explained that initially the husband was a suspect, due to on-
going divorce proceedings between himself and the victim. At 
the outset of the investigation, the analyst was responsible for 
verifying the husband’s statement, “to identify conflicts” [A4; 
25:00], where the key piece of information available was the 
husband’s phone number. In Figure 2, we show an event tree 
for this scenario where vertex stages have the prefix ‘v’. We 
have identified possible options for stages in the tree from our 
abstract question network, where probabilities can be assigned 
based upon the proportion of times a particular edge is found. 
Coloured stages are revisited and the tree is infinite.  
Despite situational differences in the scenario, by 
identifying a starting stage and input we can build a tree that 
describes all the questions the analyst asked. The network of 
investigation questions shown in Figure 3 are represented 
within event tree stages (Figure 2) and roughly reflects analyst 
questioning, where they explain that "(the) husband alerted 
officers, he said she had been on the phone to him when the 
burglary and attack occurred. I looked at telephone records to 
confirm that his statement is correct, backed up by phone 
records and corroborating information. The analyst is trying 
to back up or refute information in the statement. I'm asking 
for phone numbers within (call) data which are matched and 
person details, such as those involved in scene. I look at the 
network of which phones have called each other." [CTA; A2: 
24.00] This example demonstrates the potential to predict 
plausible question networks, even for new scenarios.  
 
Figure 3: Investigation Path for Attempted Murder Scenario 
 
 
OUTCOME: A MODEL FOR INVESTIGATION 
QUESTIONING 
 
Even in our simple example, there are 19 distinct stages 
and the tree is infinite. To represent the entirety of the tree is 
therefore not possible, yet the current tree does not clearly 
reflect the influences between states. A DCEG representation 
can be used to represent the tree “in a much more compact and 
easily interpretable form.” (Barclay et. al 2013) To build the 
DCEG, we identified probabilistic symmetries in the tree, i.e. 
stages with identical probabilities across options available. In 
our example, these are the revisited stages. Representing the 
infinite event tree as a DCEG reduces the complexity 
significantly to 7 positions. The topology of the DCEG allows 
us to assess influences across positions, where we can inspect 
and verify information held at each and the cues and intentions 
that define relationships between them. The relationships in 
our DCEG introduce their own complexities and related 
methods for information retrieval. In our DCEG a possible 
path, for example, is to find equipment involved in event data, 
then find additional events that are linked to the equipment, 
before exploring these events further. However, a relationship 
does not exist to find events connected to the equipment and 
explore these further. Instead, connected events lead to the end 
position, as these are identified as a goal based upon past 
investigations. The possible paths are constrained and an 
analyst must be aware of this when interpreting results. We 
can use our intention architecture and explanation structure 
that reflects the RPD model to enhance analyst recognition of 
the goals and constraints of selected paths.   
  
FUTURE WORK: A FOUNDATION FOR 
AUTONOMOUS QUESTIONING 
 
Under certain assumptions, a DCEG “corresponds 
directly to a semi-Markov process.” (Barclay et. al., 2013) 
Therefore, in a similar fashion to EventAction, it is possible to 
generate and select interesting lines of inquiry for an 
investigation from our DCEG. The automation of information 
retrieval could be valuable to analysts, who spend “quite a lot 
(of time) doing detective work, where a piece of intelligence is 
nothing on its own, but we needed to trawl data and find 
links.” [CTA; A4: 2.30] In the kidnapping scenario it took 16 
question stages to gather the information required to identify 
where the person had been taken. Likewise, it took 12 
question stages in the firearms dealing scenario to address 
their "need to find this person (firearm dealer)." [CTA; A4; 
09:00] An autonomous approach would save much human 
effort. However, an analyst needs to sufficiently inspect and 
verify the reasoning, goals and constraints of the methods 




We have demonstrated a novel approach to elicit 
question networks from interview data. In future work, we will 
look to capture these dynamically from interactions with a 
CA. The question networks form an event tree and a DCEG, 
from which we can generate and select lines of inquiry with an 
explanation structure at their foundation. Further consideration 
is needed for how to define goals in investigation paths. We 
propose that we can capture a better understanding of analyst 
processes and we should consider how to utlise this. Our 
approach could also develop transparent autonomous aids for 





This research was assisted by experienced intelligence 




Babuta, A. (2019) "Police Officers Raise Concerns about 
'Biased' AI Data." RUSI, Web.  
Barclay, L. M & Smith, J. Q & Thwaites, P & Nicholson, A. 
(2013). Dynamic Chain Event Graphs. 
Chiappa, Silvia, and William S. Isaac (2019). “A Causal 
Bayesian Networks Viewpoint on Fairness.” IFIP 
Advances in Information and Communication 
Technology: 3–20. Crossref. Web. 
Couchman, H. (2019). “Policing by Machine, Predictive 
Policing and the Threat to our Rights”. Liberty. 
Duquenoy, P & Gotterbarn, D & Kimppa, K & Patrignani, N 
& Wong, B.L. (2018). Addressing Ethical Challenges of 
Creating New Technology for Criminal Investigation: 
The VALCRI Project. 
Dhami, M & Belton, I & Mandel, D. (2019) The "analysis of 
competing hypotheses" in intelligence analysis. Applied 
Cognitive Psychology. 
Du, F & Plaisant, C & Spring, N & Crowley, K & 
Shneiderman, B. (2019). EventAction: A Visual 
Analytics Approach to Explainable Recommendation for 
Event Sequences. ACM Trans. Interact. Intell. Syst. 9, 4, 
Article 21 (August 2019), 31 pages.  
Klein, G. A. (1993). A recognition-primed decision (RPD) 
model of rapid decision making. In G. A. Klein, J. 
Orasanu, R. Calderwood, & C. E. Zsambok (Eds.), 
Decision making in action: Models and methods (p. 
138–147). Ablex Publishing. 
Leslie, D. (2019). Understanding artificial intelligence ethics 
and safety. 
Logan, D. C. (2009). Known knowns, known unknowns, 
unknown unknowns and the propagation of scientific 
enquiry. Journal of Experimental Botany, Volume 60, 
Issue 3, Pages 712–714.   
McDermott, P. L & Dominguez, C. O & Kasdaglis, N & 
Ryan, M. H & Trahan, I. M & Nelson, A (2018). 
Human-Machine Teaming Systems Engineering Guide. 
Mitre.  
Hepenstal, S & Kodagoda, N & Zhang, L & Paudyal, P & 
Wong, B. L. (2019a). Algorithmic Transparency of 
Conversational Agents.. In IUI ATEC. Los Angeles 
Hepenstal, S & Wong, B. L & Zhang, L & Kodagoda, N. 
(2019b). How analysts think: A preliminary study of 
human needs and demands for AI based conversational 
agents. HFES Annual Meeting. 
Hepenstal, S & Zhang, L & Kodagoda, N & Wong, B. L. 
(2020a). Pan: Conversational Agent for Criminal 
Investigations. In IUI. Cagliari, Italy 
Hepenstal, S & Zhang, L & Kodagoda, N & Wong, B. L. 
(2020b). In Proceedings of the IUI workshop on 
Explainable Smart Systems and Algorithmic 
Transparency in Emerging Technologies (ExSS-
ATEC'20). 
Hoffman, R. R., Klein, G., & Mueller, S. T. (2018). 
Explaining Explanation For “Explainable Ai.” 
Proceedings of the HFES Annual Meeting  
Shafer, G.(1996) The Art of Causal Conjecture, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, MA, 1996. 
Shaw, S (2019). Crime solving rates ‘woefully low’, Met 
Police Commissioner says. www.bbc.co.uk 
Smith, J.Q., & Anderson, P.E. (2008). Conditional 
independence and chain event graphs. Artif. Intell., 172, 
42-68. 
Stokes (2018). Forensic Science. Select Committee on Science 




Thwaites, P & Smith, J & Riccomagno, E. (2010). Causal 
analysis with Chain Event Graphs. Artif. Intell.. 174.  
Wong, B. L & Kodagoda, N. (2016). How Analysts Think: 
Anchoring, Laddering and Associations. 
